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This thesis investigates if it is possible to predict accurate and unbiased Net Asset Values for 
private equity (PE) portfolio companies using multiple valuation. The study is motivated by 
PE research that has found that General Partners (GPs) under certain circumstances have 
incentives to exert opportunistic valuations, made possible by the structure of institutional PE 
where Limited Partners (LPs) rely solely on the self-reported interim Net Asset Values 
(NAVs) from GPs.  
 
First, we construct a novel time series dataset with quarterly company level data for 141 exited 
portfolio companies in Argentum’s Nordic buyout portfolio from 2002-2020. Second, we 
gather equivalent data for publicly traded companies in the Nordics and ultimately consolidate 
the two datasets. We then match portfolio companies with comparable public peer’s contingent 
on PE selection criteria, using the matching algorithm Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). The 
objective is to test if statistical matching methods in combination with prediction models are 
able to identify representative Nordic peers and enterprise multiples that can be used to 
indicate unbiased Fair Market Values for portfolio companies given underlying market 
conditions. We measure the performance of predictions against each portfolio company’s 
corresponding exit transaction value. 
 
Our findings show that particularly one of our prediction models exhibit consistency and 
seems to predict NAVs with similar accuracy as the GP when moving further than six months 
prior to exit. There is a large increase in the GPs prediction accuracy between twelve and six 
months before exit, which is in line with our expectations given GPs informational advantage 
near exit. In summary, our results suggest that our best performing specification using CEM 
may provide a consistent and valid second opinion on the Enterprise Value of portfolio 
companies. 
 
In the final section, we explain model limitations and discuss applicableness. Although the 
peer median model predicts enterprise values with similar aggregated accuracy as the GP in 
certain periods, it is still frequently inaccurate on company level, and contingent on relatively 
strict criteria that prune observations. Further, there are confounding variables that we are 
unable to capture during matching, which would likely have facilitated better prediction 
accuracy had they been included.  
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Value is arguably the ultimate measure in financial economics since it addresses the most 
important question for all investments, the relationship between risk and reward (Koller, 
Goedhart and Wessels, 2010). Investors expect to be compensated for the level of risk they 
take on and are thus met with the fundamental questions of what value is and subsequently 
how to measure it. Further, value estimates from market participants are important for the 
functionality of capital markets as they influence portfolio decisions and consequently asset 
prices. Although some are convinced that value lies in the eyes of the beholder, market 
participants generally agree that intrinsic value, the present value of future cash flows, is the 
relevant measure for financial assets (Damodaran, 2011) 
 
The emphasis of asset valuation in academia is primarily on intrinsic (absolute) valuation 
approaches that determines the value of an asset by the present value of its expected future 
cash flows. The most common models for absolute valuation are the Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) model and the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). The 
difficulty associated with valuing an asset varies substantially across all securities and the 
process is often a mixture of art and science. Absolute valuation approaches are often sensitive 
to substantive assumptions, especially since they deal explicitly with the uncertainties of the 
future. As a consequence, it is often complemented or replaced by relative approaches that 
determines the value of a firm by comparing it to comparable firms, “comps”. Instead of 
valuing a firm’s cash flows directly, the relative approach estimates the value of a target firm 
based on the value of comps that are expected to generate similar cash flows in the future 
(Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). Relative multiple valuation can be described as taking the ratio of 
either equity- or enterprise value to a value driver like earnings or sales and applying it to a 
comparable firm.  
 
Although relative valuation may not be the primary focus in business schools, a study by Pinto, 
Robinson and Stowe (2015) shows that using multiples is the most common approach for 
professionals to evaluate individual equity securities. The beauty lies in the simplicity: it is 
convenient, easy to understand, and it reflects the current market sentiment, which may be 
valuable to get a feel for. Whilst the concept is simple on the surface, identifying proper peers 
and using them correctly is a profoundly complex process. Both methods have strengths and 
weaknesses, and a prudent investor should strive to perform both to “[…] form your own 
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opinion, and then test it against the market” (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011)Whereas public 
equities are traded on exchanges and priced every day, privately held assets are unquoted and 
often more challenging to value. In institutional private equity context, the quarterly reports 
from General Partners (GPs) update investors (Limited Partners, LPs) on the outlook and value 
of their portfolio. From initial investment until realisation, these estimated interim Net Asset 
Values (NAVs) together with accumulated fund distributions, make up the key measure for 
investors evaluating the performance of their private equity portfolio. The actual performance 
is only known at final realisation, which may be a decade into the future (Metrick and Yasuda, 
2011). The quarterly valuations are self-reported and subject to considerable discretion from 
the General Partners. This subjective component motivated Jenkinson, Sousa and Stucke 
(2013) to investigate the fairness of private equity valuations, and found that there are certain 
conflicts of interests that can give rise to “opportunistic valuations” by GPs. 
 
Private equity professionals in most cases have equity stakes in their own funds, helping to 
align incentives between investors and fund managers (Ivashina and Lerner, 2016). 
Furthermore, private equity payoff structures incentivize performance beyond the equity stake, 
as common schemes such as the “Two and Twenty1” boosts fees when a pre-specified hurdle 
is surpassed (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). While this is true, the conflict of interests referred 
to is not in the context of actual performance, but in the context of reported performance. As 
each fund has a finite lifespan, private equity firms need to continuously raise new ones to 
ensure vital future revenue. A study by Chung et al. (2012) shows that the performance of a 
current fund has a direct effect on the GPs ability to raise a successor fund. This is important 
because follow-on funds are typically raised well before current funds are fully realized. The 
marketing of follow-on funds is thus based on performance measured partly by the unrealized 
assets, which oftentimes make up the majority of the portfolio value at that time (Jenkinson et 
al., 2013). This creates a conflict of interest because it is favourable for fund managers to 
present positive interim performance numbers during this fundraising period. Other potential 
instances of opportunistic valuation include limiting asset impairments during market turmoil, 
or smoothing returns by consequently providing conservative estimates as a strategy to avoid 
negatively surprising investors at realization (Jenkinson et al., 2013). 
 
1 Two and Twenty compensation agreement: 2% annual management fee of committed capital and 20% of profits (“carried 
interest”) over a minimum return rate (“hurdle rate”). 
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3.1.1 Argentum Asset Management and Research Question 
This thesis is written in collaboration with Argentum, a specialised private equity fund investor 
designated to manage the Norwegian Government Wealth Fund for investments into unlisted 
equity in primary and secondary markets, as well as through direct co-investments. Argentum 
has invested in private equity since 2001 and has thus evolved parallel to the asset class and 
become a leading fund investor in Northern Europe2. The specialised PE investor has EUR 1.6 
Bn in committed net capital across more than 180 funds, split approximately into 81% buyout 
capital and 19% venture capital (VC). Their core focus is small and mid-cap funds in the 
Nordics, with an expanded investment area in Northwestern Europe. 
 
We investigate if it is possible to calculate accurate and unbiased Net Asset Values for 
portfolio companies using relative valuation. The research question was developed in 
collaboration with Argentum, who were particularly interested in testing the interim NAVs 
from GPs against an unbiased market-based estimate. We have signed non-disclosure 
agreements and been granted access to Argentum’ entire database with historical reporting 
from all their 180+ fund investments. This entails that the data is strictly confidential, and that 
descriptions and results are anonymized.  
 
The scope of the thesis is limited to one of Argentum’s core focuses, Nordic buyout funds3. 
We have constructed a novel time series dataset that consist of company level data for all 
Nordic buyout portfolio companies held by Nordic GPs from 2002-2020. We manually 
extracted quarterly trading data, capital structure details, NAVs and various qualitative data 
for the entire holding period of all 141 successfully exited companies in our sample held in 33 
different funds. The database consists of two subsamples since some funds only report on an 
annual basis4 (45 of the portfolio companies). The construction of a detailed private equity 
database represents a substantial part of our contribution. The second dataset contains 
equivalent quantitative data for publicly traded companies in the Nordics from 2002-2020 
gathered from Refintiv Eikon Datastream, which was ultimately consolidated with the private 
 
2 For more about this, see “The state of Nordic private equity 2020” (Argentum, 2020). 
3 See section “Private Equity Segments” for rationale. 
4 See the data section where we explain the differences in financial reporting. 
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equity database.  
 
We evaluate if statistical matching methods in combination with two separate prediction 
models are able to identify representative Nordic peers and enterprise multiples (EV/EBITDA) 
that can be used to indicate an objective Fair Market Value (FMV) given underlying market 
conditions. We deploy the matching algorithm Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) to assign 
publicly listed peers to each portfolio company in our sample. The matched peers’ median 
enterprise multiple is then used to predict the portfolio company’s interim and exit mark-to-
market value. We also employ a regression model where the matched peers’ enterprise 
multiple is OLS regressed on relevant predictors to estimate an equation for each portfolio 
company to predict its enterprise value. 
 
The ultimate test is naturally at exit when the companies are realized, but we expect biased 
results when evaluating our predictions against the GPs at exit, because their near-exit 
estimates will often be based on indicative offers from potential buyers5. Therefore, we test 
our interim predictions against the estimates from GPs with particular focus on the quarters 
within one year of exit, since these are more likely unbiased while also testable against the 
actual transaction price (due to their proximity to exit). For the annual subsample we focus on 
the two years prior to exit. To evaluate the performance of the predictions we use the Mean 
Squared Error (MSE) measure, in line with e.g., James, Witten, Hastie and Tibshirani (2013). 
Logically we expect consistency in the median model performance as it relies exclusively on 
the quality of the CEM matches and inherently deals well with outliers. The same is not true 
for regressions which we expect to perform substantially better when we implement measures 
to deal with outliers. In line with Bernström (2014), we expect that applying a systematic 
marketability (liquidity) discount to the estimated multiples increases the accuracy of the 
predictions.   
Our research question is “Private equity research has found that General Partners have 
significant discretion in determining asset values, thus we investigate if a multiple based 
statistical approach is able to deliver unbiased and accurate valuation results.” 
 
 
5 This is frequently communicated in quarterly reports. 
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The primary motivation of the study is to create a practical tool that Argentum can use on live 
portfolio companies. The tool itself is comprised of the private and public equity databases, a 
Stata do-file with matching specifications, 22 sub-routines comprising 1720 lines of code 
written from scratch in Microsoft’s programming language “Visual Basic for Applications” 
(VBA) used to process and transform the datasets for analysis, and finally an additional do-
file with regression specifications and Stata packages for each portfolio company and its peers.  
 
There are not many similar studies in academia as detailed proprietary PE datasets are not 
readily available, primarily due to confidentiality considerations. Furthermore, portfolio 
valuation tools that can be used for in-house purposes are naturally not publicly available. 
Argentum has been invested in Nordic buyout funds for a long time and our sample is thus 
thorough, covering an estimated 20% of the universe of our study6. We hope to contribute 
operationally for Argentum and academically by studying the uncharted territory of data-
driven private equity valuations. The thesis is interesting for anyone interested in private 
equity, corporate finance, valuation, prediction and portfolio management. 
 
3.1.2 Results 
We calculate the mean squared error for each prediction in order to evaluate our results. The 
MSE is then averaged and aggregated for each model specification and iteration. Mean 
squared error is not meaningful in isolation and must be evaluated relative to the performance 
of other model specifications or GP estimates. The results show that for the quarterly 
subsample, our median model exhibits consistency in its predictions. It also seems to predict 
at least at the level of GP accuracy when moving further than six months prior to exit. In line 
with our expectation, there is a large spike in GP accuracy between twelve and six months 
before exit, likely because the GP receives an indicative offer or has entered negotiations. This 
finding is supported by the annual sample, which also shows that GP predictions are more 
accurate closer to exit. The median model exhibits consistency for the annual subsample as 
well, however it should be noted that since this sample is relatively small it is more prone to 
random noise. Further, for both subsamples the regression models performs seemingly 
 
6 Our defined universe = Exited deals from Nordic buyout funds (managed by Nordic GPs) from 2002-2020. Calculated with 
data from Preqin. 
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consistent after we implement measures to deal with outliers, although not particularly 
accurate in relative terms. We also find support for our expectation that leveraging knowledge 
of variables when coarsening for matching seems to help avoid assigning poor matches. We 
emphasize the results from our quarterly sample as this is the largest sample and has the most 
frequent financial reporting. In summary, the results suggests that our best performing 
specification using substantive knowledge on variable coarsening may provide a consistent 
and valid second opinion on the Enterprise Value of portfolio companies. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. In the next section we outline background information on 
private equity and limited partnerships, and how our study relates to existing literature. Section 
III explains the peer selection frameworks we employ. Section IV provides a detailed 
explanation of the data. Following the data section, we provide our methodological analysis. 
Finally, section VI discusses results and concludes. 
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4. Background and Related Literature 
4.1.1 Private Equity and Limited Partnerships 
The universe of our study is institutional private equity, which excludes the majority of private 
companies since they are not investable for an institutional investor due to e.g., size and 
financial constraints (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018). Private equity in institutional context 
refers to equity investments in unlisted firms by professional investors. The common structure 
of institutional PE is through a private limited liability partnership, with capital invested by 
Limited Partners and managed by a General Partner. The GPs represent professional financial 
intermediaries often referred to as private equity firms. The contractual term of the limited 
partnership (fund) is typically ten years with fund extension options ranging from one to three 
years (Kaplan and Sensoy, 2015). The LPs commit capital which is typically drawn by the GP 
over a five-year investing period while attractive target firms are identified. As previously 
mentioned, GPs need to raise follow-on funds to secure future revenue. The interval between 
any subsequent funds depends on the success of the predecessor and typically ranges from two 
to seven years (Jenkinson et al., 2013). The opportunistic valuation issues that may arise during 
fundraising in this interval is part of the motivation for our study. 
 
Despite the potential opportunistic valuation issues that may arise due to the illiquidity of PE, 
industry advocates argue that the asset class facilitates an advantageous long-term value 
creation perspective, absent from the short-term pressures of liquid markets (Koller et al., 
2010; NY Times, 2012). Furthermore, PE focuses on alignment of interests between 
ownership and management as the latter are also expected to invest in the portfolio companies 
(Ivashina and Lerner, 2016).  
 
4.1.2 Private Equity Segments 
Private equity can be categorized into buyout, venture capital and growth capital. The thesis 
focuses on buyouts, which is by far the largest category of private equity (Metrick and Yasuda, 
2011). Buyout funds seek to execute control and co-control investments typically in mature 
mid to large-sized companies in leading market positions with solid cash flows, but with 
potential for revenue and earnings growth, predominately financed by leverage (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009). The “buyout” term stems from the tendency for buyout funds to acquire the 
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majority stake in the target company (buying out the owner), thus gaining control over it. 
Although the objective is to capitalize on the untapped potential of a target company, the 
model focuses primarily on scaling and margin improvement rather than turning unprofitable 
businesses around (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).  
 
Venture- and growth capital are earlier stages of private equity, with VC being the earliest and 
growth capital often entailing late-stage VC in profitable firms financed by subordinated debt 
(Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). Although venture and growth capital make up a substantial part 
Argentum’s portfolio, they are not included in our study. This is because valuing companies 
using earnings multiples requires a high degree of stability in earnings and cash flows. Due to 
the early-stage characteristics of venture and growth capital, the companies have not reached 
maturity and stable growth, and as a consequence are often not fit for comparable multiple 
valuation (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011).  
4.1.3 General Partner Valuation Policy 
The International Private Equity and Venture Capital (IPEV) Valuation Guidelines describe 
broad yet important private equity concepts for the industry to lean on regarding the value of 
assets held by Limited Partnerships. The guidelines are endorsed by all the GPs in our sample, 
ensuring at least a theoretical resemblance in the estimation of interim values. Although the 
guidelines facilitate transparency and standardization in valuation framework principles and 
emphasizes consistency and comparability, they do not guarantee unbiased valuations. Private 
equity research by Brown, Gredil and Kaplan (2018) describe opportunistic valuation 
challenges and find that some underperforming managers inflate reported returns during 
fundraising of follow-on funds. Using a dataset from the largest U.S. investor in private equity, 
Calpers7, Jenkinson et al., (2013) find similar results and warn investors of basing investment 
decisions regarding follow-on funds on the reported returns of a current fund. Even though 
fund managers comply with IPEV Guidelines, there is still room to exert subjectiveness that 
can affect valuations in the GPs desired direction. As a Limited Partner who frequently 
reinvests in follow-on funds, this is highly relevant for Argentum. 
 
 
7 Calpers is short for California Public Employees’ Retirement System. 
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Although observable market prices are not available for unlisted private equity investments 
General Partners must report interim company values and portfolio updates, as per the limited 
partnership agreement. Fund valuation policy is typically communicated in quarterly reports 
where The IPEV methodologies are generally applied. IPEV defines Fair Value in accordance 
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 13 as “… the price that would be 
received to sell an asset in an Orderly Transaction between Market Participants at the 
Measurement Date”. Transparent, independent and credible valuations are increasingly being 
requested from limited partners (FW, 2014). In spite of this, most of the GPs in Argentum’s 
buyout portfolio value in-house seemingly without consultation from third parties other than 
adjustments made at fiscal year-end audits. This may however be inaccurate since it is not 
certain that funds would disclose third-party consultation. Some GPs disclose their valuation 
principles, although to varying extent, with some observed commonalities. We outline these 
commonalities and how General Partners value assets given their practical implementation of 
IPEV Valuation Guidelines, as gathered from their quarterly reports. For the guidelines 
themselves we refer to IPEVs December 2018 version.  
 
Investments are typically valued at cost for at least the first year, taking the taking the bid spot 
exchange rate as at the last day in the quarter into consideration (IPEV, 2018). However, if the 
newly acquired portfolio company’s trading is significantly below expectation or there has 
been adverse changes in market or economic conditions, fund managers state that they write 
down asset values to reflect the impairments. Following the first year’s holding period, a 
variety of valuation methodologies are applied depending on the asset’s characteristics and its 
market.  
 
GPs valuation of portfolio companies beyond the first year of holding is usually comprised of 
either a peer group multiple, a sum-of-the-parts calculation, a Discounted Cash Flow, or a 
combination. Comparable multiples are appropriate earnings or sales multiples for public 
companies that are comparable especially in industry and size to the investee company 
(Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). GPs often adjust multiples before applying them to the target 
firm’s relevant accounting measure, which is also often substantively normalized (IPEV, 
2018).  
 
Although relative valuation is common, GPs state that they base them on fundamental analysis 
where company performance, revenue and earnings growth outlook, changes in cash flows 
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and recapitalizations and other capital structure transactions are evaluated. The fundamental 
analysis serves as the basis from which material impacts on the selection of comparable peers 
or the applied multiple are considered. Further, corporate transactions executed or pending in 
the company or for comparable issuers are considered either directly as a multiple or for 
adjustment, but in line with e.g., Bernström (2014), these are not applied together with quoted 
companies’ multiples. GPs also consider offerings in equity or debt, together with the overall 
solidity situation, to reflect capital structure characteristics.  
 
Theory suggests that the value of shares in a quoted company should be higher than that of 
shares in an equivalent private company due to investors preference for liquidity (Bernström, 
2014). As a consequence, one would expect the lack of marketability to constitute a discount 
for private companies to peers. IPEV Guidelines (2018) describe the risk associated with the 
lack of liquidity and suggests calibrating the applied market multiple with regard to liquidity 
and other risk factors. In line with findings from Harjoto and Paglia (2010) who investigated 
the discount for lack of marketability (DLOM) for private companies, we observe that most 
GPs who disclose their valuation methodologies indicate a discount, typically ranging from 
10-20% to the weighted peer enterprise multiple. Some GPs employ marketability discounts 
on portfolio level, whereas most assess the risk associated with lack of marketability 
individually8. 
 
On the other hand, it is theorized by control premium theory that firm value increases when 
owners acquire a controlling share, which is especially relevant in the buyout context. Control 
is advantageous because there is arguably value in being able to run a company differently and 
better than comparable companies (Damodaran, 2005). 
 
To demonstrate the extent of GP discretion in valuation using multiples, we portray a simple 
example of how a portfolio of buyout companies was actually valued as disclosed in an 
extended quarterly report. The GP chose 3-15 peers for each portfolio company with earnings 
multiples gathered from the two most recent years. The implied multiples and years were then 
assigned weights, which were then adjusted for a marketability discount that resulted in a final 
 
8 This is consistent with the research from Harjoto and Paglia (2010) who found that discounts vary substantially across 
industries. 
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weighted enterprise multiple. The implied Enterprise Value was ultimately adjusted for Net 
Debt to derive the weighted Equity Value9. As the approach was consistent with their previous 
valuations and satisfied general principles, it is thus complaint with IPEV Valuation 
Guidelines. This demonstrates that there is a vast range of equity values for a given investee 
company. In another instance two GPs from our sample had jointly invested in a portfolio 
company and valued it substantially different, where the difference in estimated value at one 
point exceeded the total estimation from the conservative GP. 
 
Further, regulators are concerned about the discretion that GPs has in picking the comparables, 
particularly that they “cherry pick” comparable public companies (Grant Thornton 2021; 
Clifford Chance 2020). This entails that GPs could theoretically create comparable sets based 
on performance in trading and stock price, pulling out poor performers to boost the applied 
group multiple. Comparable transaction multiples could in theory also be subject to cherry 





9 Equity Value = Enterprise Value – Net Debt 
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5. Peer Group Identification 
The selection of comparable sets to draw inference from is likely to be the most critical step 
in terms of impact on ultimate prediction from the valuation tool. This poses important 
questions regarding what comparability is, as well as the overall process of selecting 
comparable quoted companies. Before we identify the peers, we thus need to outline 
comparability in the context of relative valuation. This is done by discussing multiples and 
reformulating the enterprise multiple to address its value drivers, such that we can discuss the 
characteristics that public companies have to exhibit similarity in for comparable valuation to 
be accurate. We then move on to matching. For this purpose, we employ matching algorithms 
with several iterations and recalibrate to improve the ultimate tool performance. Under 
Matching we first explain data preprocessing through matching, its goals, our methodology 
for peer identification - Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) and ultimately variable selection. 
5.1 Muliple Selection and Value Drivers 
Mark-to-market peer group multiples is the most common methodology used to indicate the 
value of mature private equity assets, at least in the context of quarterly reporting. This is 
arguably because of its simplicity and due to the financial structuring in private equity. 
Although discounted cash flow analysis is more accurate and flexible, it is often a tedious task 
that requires high precision since it relies heavily on forecasts (Koller et al., 2010). Taken into 
the context of our study, present discounted valuation is not a viable option since it has the 
inherent bias from forecasting and cannot be fully automated.  
 
Further, it is important to emphasize the manner of which comparable multiples are calculated. 
The point is that there must be consistency between the numerator and denominator to avoid 
bias: value must be paired with the corresponding income source. For instance, the numerator 
of enterprise multiples must include the market value of both equity capital and debt (i.e., all 
investor capital), while the denominator must include income to all investors, both 
shareholders and debt claimers (Bernström 2014). If consistency is not achieved, the multiple 
will be biased in a direction depending on the over- or understatement of either the numerator 
or denominator (Koller et al., 2010). 
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Many industry professionals use price multiples, especially the price-to-earnings multiple, 





𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 
 
For our purpose, P/E multiple has two primary flaws: first, that it can only be used for entities 
that have similar capital structure, and second that it is calculated before nonoperating items 
such as one-off losses or gains, which may be significant, and are important to capture (IPEV, 
2018; Koller et al., 2010). Thus, it may provide values that does not reflect the financial reality. 
 
Enterprise Value multiples, on the other hand, removes the influences of capital structure, a 
feature that is essential for our study with an observational dataset of leveraged buyouts. EV 
multiples take the entity market value in relation to an appropriate base metric, such as 
revenue, EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization), EBITA 
(earnings before interest, taxes and amortization) or FCFF (free cash flow to firm) (Bernström 
2014). Literature generally agrees that for most purposes EBITDA or EBITA, which are 
calculated after nonoperating items, in combination with EV are the most appropriate metrics 
to compare peer valuations e.g., because they minimize accounting differences (Koller et al., 
2010). Using EBITA over EBITDA may be argued since depreciation might be essential to 
comprehend certain companies’ value. This is especially important for industries where 
depreciation represents a precise predictor of a firm’s capital expenditure (capex) in the future 
(Koller et al., 2010). However, EBITDA is generally more accurate when depreciation does 
not provide consistent estimates of future capex. In the equity valuation paper by Pinto, et al., 
(2015) EBITDA is further supported by the fact that it is the most widely used metric in 
combination with EV by business professionals. This is also anecdotally supported by our 
findings, where all 141 portfolio companies include EBITDA in the financials, and only a few 
include EBITA, indicating the former as the preferred choice also from a practical standpoint. 
 
The issue of bias from forecasting should also be addressed for multiples, since many industry 
professionals substitute the latest fiscal year earnings with forecasts for the following year(s). 
In line with Metrick and Yasuda (2011), we use recent historical financials since we want to 
maintain the notion that the relative valuations should reflect the markets opinion of company 
value. We therefore ensure that the financials we gather are not forecasts, which are often also 
included in the private equity fund reports (see data section). By gathering Enterprise Value 
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as the sum of market value of Equity and Net Debt, and the most recent historical EBITDA 
for public companies, we ensure that the derived enterprise multiple reflects the market 
opinion. Koller et al., (2010), on the other hand, suggests the opposite, that forward-looking 
multiples should rather be applied. The main argument is that forecasted estimates have better 
empirical evidence of accuracy (also noted by Metrick and Yasuda), which although true, is 
not a compelling argument for our application since we aim for unbiasedness. The somewhat 
self-explanatory, but still relevant downside of focusing on market valuations, is that the 
market sentiment may be wrong, thus leading to over/undervaluation. Such questions are 
addressed when we evaluate our predictions against actual exit realizations (see 
Methodological Analysis and Results sections). The market multiples are calculated from the 
price quotations of EV and interim earnings gathered at the relevant last day of quarter/year 
from Datastream. These are applied such that portfolio company Enterprise Values are 
calculated by: 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑜 =  
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑜  
To better grasp the dynamics of the multiple, we show how it derives primarily from the value 
drivers profitability, growth and risk. This is done by reformulating the equation under 
guidance of Damodaran (2012).  Starting with EV: 

















𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑔 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑇 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟 = 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
∆𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
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From the last equation it is evident that the key value drivers of EV are profitability (through 
EBITDA, corporate tax rate and depreciation), growth (growth rate) and risk (cost of capital) 
(Damodaran, 2006). This is important to recognize because it clarifies the factors that 
companies have to exhibit similarity in for enterprise multiple valuations to be applicable. The 
derivation of the value drivers of EV/EBITDA thus has consequences for how we make 
predictions, which we emphasize through both matching and model specifications. 
 
5.2 Matching 
Matching is a method used to control for confounding influences of pre-treatment covariates 
and thus addresses selection bias to enable causal inference from an intervention. Selection 
bias refers to bias in predictions or estimates caused by endogenous sample selection 
(Woolridge, 2013). We pair non-treated participants with treated participants conditional on 
similarity in important characteristics, such that the differences in outcome between the groups 
can be attributed to the treatment. These characteristics, referred to as pre-treatment covariates 
or confounders, are covariates that have to influence both participation (PE selection) as well 
as the outcome variable (some valuation metric), without being affected by treatment (thereof 
“pre-treatment”) (Rosenbaum 1984; Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008). The matches are 
therefore preferably assigned at entry (which varies for all portfolio companies) and kept until 
exit. Matching methods are preprocessing algorithms, and statistical estimation is the typical 
route post-matching to make causal inferences. Regular estimation is however not our 
objective, our purpose is to provide unbiased matches whose values are used for prediction. 
Through matching we ideally identify peer companies that are identical to the portfolio 
companies in all regards relevant for predicting enterprise multiple, except not being acquired 
by private equity. We evaluate the quality and applicableness of the matched peer’s ex post, 
by running tests tailored for our special application. (Iacus, King and Porro 2012). 
 
5.2.1 Goals of Matching 
The principal goal of matching is to prune observations from observational data to achieve 
more balance between the treatment and control group, entailing that there is more similarity 
in the empirical distributions of the variables between the groups (Iacus et al., 2012). We 
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employ CEM and match on substantively coarsened variables which creates a perfectly 
balanced dataset. Coarsening represents a trade-off between the number of observations and 
model dependence, because reduced model dependence achieved by perfect balance can imply 
fine-grained coarsening which prunes a lot of observations (Iacus et al., 2012). 
 
5.2.2 Notation and Quantities of Interest 
In our dataset Ti is a dichtomous treatment variable for unit i (i = 1,. . ., n) which has value 1 
if it is part of the treatment group and 0 if its is untreated and part of the control group. The 
treatment is whether the company i in our merged database is a PE portfoltio company. The 
dependent variable Yi represents a valuation metric such as EV/EBITDA, although not 
practically important since we are not estimating a treatment effect. Nontheless it is useful to 
outline the notation and theoretical quanteties of interesent to better explain the framework. Xi 
represents the relevant pre-treatment covariates that we have extracted from quarterly fund 
reports and Datastream, such that the theoretical esimated Treatment Effect for treated (Ti=1) 
observation i would be equal to TEi = Yi (Ti = 1) – Yi (Ti = 0), where the unobserved 
counterfactual Yi (Ti = 0) is estimated from the matched Xi controls.  The total Sample Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated is equal to  𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇 =
1
𝑛𝑇
  ∑ 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑖∈{𝑇𝑖=1} .  
To get unbiased estimates post-matching, we also require the ignorability assumption to be 
satisfied, that there are no omitted variables correlated with both the dependent and 
independent variables. (Iacus et al., 2012). 
5.2.3 Coarsened Exact Matching 
Coarsened exact matching was introduced by Iacus, King and Porro in their article10 on causal 
inference from matching that was published in Political Analysis. CEM approximates a fully 
blocked experiment and thus achieves an exactly balanced data pool without necessarily 
requiring a large sample11. This can be conceptualized as follows. Whereas the standard 
experiment design, complete randomization, flips a coin for each observation to determine 
 
10See “Causal Inference without Balance Checking: Coarsened Exact Matching”, latest version released in 2011. 
11 Randomized experiments often require large samples to achieve balance (King, 2018) 
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treatment, a fully blocked experiment matches (blocks) on the covariate(s) of interest and then 
flips a coin for each pair (King, 2018).  
 
CEM handles well the “the curse of dimensionality”, that exact matching on several variables 
may produce few matches because two observations are not likely to be identical across all of 
them (Ho et al., 2007). We temporarily coarsen into substantively meaningful bins determined 
at our discretion or by the CEM default binning algorithm, then exact match on the coarsened 
data, and ultimately move on to prediction with the original uncoarsened data for the 
observations that were matched. CEM is a monotonic imbalance bounding method, entailing 
that reducing imbalance (more coarsening) on one covariate has no impact on others. Making 
balance decisions ex ante is preferable to the manual process of reestimating and adjusting the 
model to achieve a certain maximum imbalance, which is the case for other matching methods. 
We do however experiment with varying levels of coarsening to evaluate differences in 
ultimate prediction power.  
5.2.4 Alternative Methods 
Propensity score matching is a common way of identifying the counterfactual in private equity 
literature. Introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), PSM estimates the conditional 
probability of treatment given specified covariates (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Instead of 
matching on coarsened covariates, it calculates the probability of treatment given a vector of 
the covariates, often assigning nearest-neighbor12 matches conditional on the score. The logic 
of covariate selection and time of measuring is the same for PSM as CEM, but the method 
does not leave room for substantive decisions on covariates from expert knowledge. 
Furthermore, since we are creating a tool to be used for live deals, it is advantageous that 
“CEM is faster, easier to use and understand, requires fewer assumptions, is more easily 
automated, and possesses more attractive statistical properties for many applications than 
existing matching methods” (Blackwell et al., 2010). We refer to the implementation section 
for a thorough explanation of the practical implications of using CEM. 
 
12 There are several methods for matching propensity scores other than nearest-neighbor, see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). 
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6. Data 
The novel dataset constructed from manual collection of data from Nordic PE deals done by 
Nordic GPs, combined with a dataset of public companies, create the basis for our analysis. In 
this section, we explain the datasets by providing an overview of the data gathering process 
and adjustments made to collected variables with the purpose of making data operational. First, 
we introduce the PE portfolio of Argentum and explain how data from quarterly reports were 
used to create our buyout dataset. Second, we show how Refinitiv Eikon Datastream was used 
to gather a sample of listed companies to be used for matching. Finally, we evaluate the two 
datasets in context of each other, identifying additional areas for cleaning and the creation of 
new metrics in both datasets. For this reason, both datasets will be presented in the end of the 
chapter. 
6.1 Private Companies 
6.1.1 Source 
Argentum 
The source for our buyout sample is the quarterly reports of PE funds currently or previously 
in the PE portfolio of Argentum as of February 2021, which makes Q3 2020 the latest reports 
accessible. In the database we have gained access to, we identify 182 different funds managed 
by 94 GPs. On their website, Argentum reports being invested in 187 funds, meaning we are 
able to cover nearly all of Argentum’s fund investments 13. Of our total, 148 are identified as 
buyout and 34 as venture. The majority of funds are focused on the Nordics and Northwestern 
Europe, while there is also exposure to funds with focus on global opportunities and Southern 
Europe. 
 
Portfolio Company Information in Private Equity Quarterly Reports 
While quarterly reports of public companies are relatively uniform, quarterly reports of private 
equity companies are more diverse in both form and content. This has made the data gathering 
 
13 There is only one fund in the online portfolio list which we are unable to find in our database, suggesting that the rest of 
the difference is due to funds not reported either due to being too new or for other reasons 
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challenging as not all metrics or information that we would prefer to collect for our analysis 
is available for all funds. Thus, in order to aggregate the data, we resort to metrics which are 
common for the majority of funds. For this reason, we give a brief explanation of what 
information about the portfolio companies is usually found in a PE quarterly report. 
 
Most reports start with a fund summary page, explaining the fund terms and focus of the fund, 
notably mentioning geographic scope and investment stage of the fund. This is followed by a 
valuation section providing the stated FMV of the specified ownership stake the fund has in 
each portfolio company. FMV includes the value of all equity, including common shares, 
preference shares and shareholder loans. 
 
Later, there is usually a section for each unrealized portfolio company providing qualitative 
information about geography, industry and market outlook, in addition to more in-depth 
information about its valuation, capital structure and trading for the current quarter or year14, 
and often for a few periods back. Information about trading is typically not available in the 
report for the quarter of the respective portfolio company’s entry and exit. Similarly, pre-entry 
metrics are rare, with relatively few GPs providing revenue and EBITDA, and close to none 
provide Net Debt. 
 
Valuation and capital structure related metrics include FMV, Net Debt and EV. Often, one of 
the mentioned metrics will be missing, but there is usually sufficient information to calculate 
it. For trading, a quarterly or Year To Date (YTD) sales metric such as revenue or sales is 
included, as well as quarterly or YTD profit metrics such as EBITDA or EBITA, but 
occasionally only one is provided. Both net debt and the trading metrics are often normalized, 
but it differs between GPs to what extent this is elaborated on and if there is information about 
it at all. Some GPs also include information about the portfolio companies’ balance sheets, 
relevant peer groups, estimates of future sales and margins and the valuation methods used. If 
provided, the balance sheet may be used to find information about potential shareholder loans, 
 
14 Potentially non-standard Fiscal Year 
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as well as backing out Net Debt subtracting cash from total debt in cases where Net Debt is 
not explicitly stated elsewhere. 
While most GPs release quarterly reports with updated metrics for all portfolio companies, 
some release more infrequently. This can be either once every year or half-year, the latter at 
either odd or even quarters. There are also cases of GPs releasing fund reports quarterly, but 
updating the portfolio companies’ valuations more infrequently. 
 
Alternative Sources Considered 
The restrictions in accounting data posed by the use of quarterly reports exclusively, meant 
that we were limited to key financial metrics and relatively few balance sheet items. Some 
GPs might include more detailed data about pre-deal information in confidential data rooms 
that Argentum is granted access to during fundraising, but investigating this would be outside 
the scope and time constraint of the thesis and likely introduce bias as the depth of the data 
rooms might vary substantially. 
 
For this reason, we have researched both academic and commercial external sources to find 
sources that could provide more financial metrics and particularly financials for the portfolio 
companies pre-entry. For Norwegian private companies registered in the company registry 
Brønnøysundregisteret, it is possible to get detailed information of annual accounting data 
from Proff Forvalt back to the 1990s. Similarly, Rakner & Rasmussen (2013) also working 
with Argentum data, were able to use the SNF’s and NHH’s database of accounting and 
business information to extract accounting information for Norwegian buyout companies. 
However, equivalent sources for a Nordic sample were not as readily available. For example, 
the Swedish company register Bolagsverket charges a fee per annual report retrieved. 
 
We also investigated the databases Amadeus and Orbis which contains information on private 
companies, both by business information provider Bureau Van Dijk, but these databases were 
highly inconsistent. Both were incomplete for Swedish and Danish companies, only 
containing the last five years of accounting data for Denmark and in general few observations 
beyond the last nine years. In correspondence with Bureau Van Dijk, we learned that the 
limitation was due to contractual reasons from their data providers. Finally, the data provider 
S&P Compustat Global was considered, but it did not seem to have information on medium 
to small private companies. 
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As we were unsuccessful in finding adequate alternative data providers for private company 
information beyond Norway, we decided for consistency reasons to solely use the quarterly 
reports from Argentum and the financial metrics found there for our analysis. While finding 
an alternative source for accounting information would have been useful for retrieving pre-
entry metrics, it would not fully solve the challenge of few financial metrics as the metrics 
would be derived from annual reports, thus creating a discrepancy in the frequency of 
information since most data would still be gathered quarterly.  
6.1.2 Data Gathering 
Starting with 182 funds identified in Argentum’s database, we used fund and company 
characteristics to narrow the scope to identify the deals relevant for our analysis. On fund 
level, we used information found in the quarterly report summary together with Argentum’s 
classification of their portfolio on their website15 to identify and exclude all VC funds. This 
includes growth, seed and expansion funds. This excluded 34 funds. Of the remaining funds, 
we used the same approach to identify which funds were Nordic based16 and thus relevant for 
our analysis. From a start of 148 buyout funds, 66 funds were left after excluding non-Nordic 
funds. 
 
After having identified relevant funds, we went through over 800 reports17, working our way 
through company level data from the oldest report of a fund and forward. This approach was 
chosen as we wanted to collect data in a manner of which the tool would be used. This is also 
important because we frequently encountered situations where newer reports adjusted 
previous financials slightly, as they for instance later identified one-offs. Not all deals were 
applicable to our analysis, thus the following considerations were made: 
 
Nordic deals only:  In line with our desired focus, non-Nordic deals were excluded based on 
headquarters, such that only companies with headquarters in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
 
15 https://argentum.no/nb/portfolio/  
16 Defined as having a Nordic headquarter 
17 Only counting the reports where we followed one or more portfolio companies. There were also many reports investigated 
which did not have any relevant portfolio companies, as per the following exclusions. 
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Finland were included. We have not excluded companies based on the markets they are 
operating in, meaning that it is possible for some to have most of their revenue stream outside 
of the Nordics and in that regard be less of a Nordic company. While information about 
markets served is relevant for matching purposes (IPEV, 2018), this proved difficult to filter 
on as there were large differences between whether or not GPs provided this information. 
 
Realized deals only: Our tool can be applied on live deals to match the portfolio companies 
with public peers, but we need market value realizations to be able to compare how well the 
peer matching and models perform in predicting exit multiples. Deals not realized by Q3 2020 
are thus excluded. 
 
Excluded growth companies: Some of the buyout funds also invest in growth companies, 
which is mentioned in the fund objective and summary part of the quarterly reports. For 
consistency in our analysis, as we want stable buyout companies where the EV/EBITDA 
multiple is applicable, growth deals are excluded as revenue multiples are more relevant for 
these deals (IPEV, 2018). We identified these portfolio companies by the GPs’ classification 
of the deal, while also checking the equity stake percentage and characteristics to substantiate 
our choices. 
 
Excluded bankrupt companies: Companies approaching bankruptcy will typically stop being 
valued by EV/EBITDA multiple and start being valued at other metrics such as NAV (IPEV, 
2018), such that our tool is not fitting to value. Our exclusions include both write-offs where 
the FMV is set to zero as well as where the equity is sold for a symbolic sum. 
 
Excluded companies without sufficient information: Some companies had to be excluded 
because it was not possible to extract sufficient information about either valuation metrics or 
trading that were needed for them to be included in the analysis. There were predominately 
two reasons for this. First, especially older funds showed inconsistencies in what metrics were 
reported, such that for example Net Debt was missing or EBITA was used instead of EBITDA 
with no way of calculating the missing metric. Second, a proportion of the funds in Argentum’s 
portfolio originate from secondary market transactions, such that quarterly reports prior to the 
acquisition were missing. As quarterly reports often show valuation and trading for a few 
periods back, we were able to extract the necessary information for some companies even 
 28
without the older quarterly reports, but several were excluded because we were not able to get 
data for the full lifespan of the companies. 
6.1.3 Variables 
In accordance with our methodological framework seen in the context of available information 
from quarterly reports, the following variables were collected: 
Table 1 – Variables for PE companies 
 
Other variables occasionally used to indirectly acquire the variables in the table were also 
collected. These include the fund’s ownership stake in the portfolio company, shareholder 
loan, YTD revenue and YTD EBITDA. The combination of often having to find variables 
indirectly and having many assumptions made which might have implications for the analysis, 






Date Date for the observation reported on a quarterly basis
Fund and Fund Manager Fund and Fund Manager
Company Name The newest name of the company
Industry Industry as reported by the GP
Fair Market Value The value of all equity in the portfolio company
Net Debt Market value of Net Debt, often proxied by book value 
of Net Debt
Enterprise Value Enterprise Value
Revenue Quarterly and annually
EBITDA Quarterly and annually
Currency Currencies used for valuation and trading
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6.1.4 Qualitative Information 
Date 
Collecting data for the quarterly sample was always done on a quarterly basis dating the 
observation to the last day of the corresponding quarter. For the annual sample, we chose to 
report data as per the last day in Q4, as annual companies tended to be reported in the Q4 
annual reports. However, this creates some differences in the exit date as an exit valuation 
happening earlier in the year will in this way be reported as being exited in Q4. Similarly, 
entry dates for annual companies is set to Q4 of the entry year. 
At entry, we rarely observed trading and capital structure data prior to buyout. As the search 
for alternative sources to provide this information was unsuccessful, we did not include pre-
entry observations in the sample. Thus, the observation period for each company starts at their 
respective entry periods. 
 
At exit, the GP sometimes keep the company on their balance sheet after company realization 
if the exit was by IPO or if they expect an earn-out, as there is still value in the company for 
the fund. We regard the period of the realization event as the last observation in our dataset, 
as this is the point at which we get an unbiased market value for the company. Partial 
realizations during the lifespan of the portfolio company are not treated as exits. 
 
Company Name 
The portfolio company might change name through its lifespan, either because of a rebranding 
or due to merging or carve-out. In cases of a rebranding we have used the newest name, but 
noted and kept track of the older names for reference as the dataset is to be operational for 
Argentum at a later stage. 
Industry 
GPs usually report the industry of their portfolio companies, often at two levels where one is 
the sector and the other one is a more specialized industry designation. We retrieved both, but 
for comparison purposes, these would later need to be converted to a common industry code 





FMV, Net Debt and EV 
If not stated directly the FMV of each portfolio company was gathered indirectly by 
subtracting Net Debt from EV. For the majority of companies, EV was stated directly, or 
alternatively found using the fund’s valuation multiple for the company, typically 
EV/EBITDA multiplied with the corresponding EBITDA used as basis by the GP. In most 
cases it was possible to verify the FMV of the company by dividing the FMV of the fund’s 
investment in the company by the fund’s ownership percentage to get the full FMV. However, 
this check was not reliable if it was not possible to adjust the fund’s FMV for potential 
shareholder loans, as the fund’s ownership percentage usually referred to the ownership of 
shares in the company on a fully diluted basis. For example, if the majority of the FMV of the 
fund’s investment in the company derived from a shareholder loan, the FMV for the company 
would be overstated when divided by the ownership percentage. Rather, it would be necessary 
to subtract the shareholder loan from the fund’s FMV, divide the latter by the fund’s ownership 
percentage and then add back the value of all shareholder loans to the company. 
 
If Net Debt was not stated directly and we had the necessary balance sheet information, the 
metric was found subtracting cash from total debt. In a few cases where both EV and FMV 
for the company was known, but not the Net Debt, Net Debt was found as the difference 
between the two. For most companies, the reported Net Debt figure was stated to be 
normalized, but this was not always clear from the reports. For comparison to be possible, we 
assume the net debt to be normalized if not explicitly stated. 
6.1.6 Trading 
Revenue & EBITDA 
While some GPs provide quarterly numbers directly, the revenue and EBITDA were most 
often found through the difference in the stated YTD figure, subtracting the previous period’s 
YTD metric from the current one. In cases where the portfolio company used a non-standard 
Fiscal Year for its reporting, it was generally possible to use a combination of annual figures, 
YTD and previous non-standard quarterly figures to get standard quarterly figures. 
 
Similarly to Net Debt, a potential issue regarding both trading metrics is that there are 
differences in whether they are normalized by the GP or not, and to what extent information 
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about this is given on a quarterly basis. For example, some GPs include one-offs in the reported 
trading and write a footnote about it, others normalize the trading and write a footnote about 
how trading is normalized, while others do not comment on it at all. The IPEV (2018) 
guidelines, which all funds in our sample follow, suggests that the GPs should “[…]represent 
a reasonable estimate of maintainable earnings, which implies the need to adjust for 
exceptional or non-recurring items[…]”. Thus, we assume that trading is adjusted unless 
explicitly communicated otherwise and use what is reported in the trading figures without 
adjusting and investigate potential outliers at a later stage. 
 
6.1.7 Currency 
Currency used for reporting in PE is not standardized, thus the GPs reporting currency differ, 
even between the fund itself and its portfolio companies. Typically, one currency is used for 
valuations across the fund’s investments, while local portfolio company currency was used for 
trading. We collected figures in both EUR, NOK, DKK and SEK for our samples, noting the 
valuation and trading in their original currencies and converting everything into EUR for 
comparison purposes. This was done by using the exchange rate at the end of day of the 
respective quarters, thus the end of Q4 for the annual sample. The currency data was retrieved 
from Yahoo Finance. 
 
The figures were converted from their local currencies into EUR as this was the currency most 
frequently used by both the funds and the portfolio companies. An issue with this approach is 
that companies reporting in a currency more heavily impacted by macroeconomic events 
might have their valuation and trading slightly misrepresented from period to period by the 
exchange rate. We find converting the local currencies into EUR as the preferable option as 





6.2 Public Companies 
6.2.1 Source 
Refinitiv Eikon Datastream 
The source for our sample of listed companies is Refinitiv Eikon Datastream, which is a 
financial data analysis platform with access to accounting data for listed companies in all 
Nordic countries back to our desired starting point of 2002. Datastream was chosen not only 
because it is one of the world’s leading providers of financial markets data, but also since it is 
the commercial data provider of choice for Argentum. This satisfied our priority that the 
database and tool created is operational for Argentum and can be updated and developed 
further if desired. 
 
Data Gathering 
From the database of Datastream, we filter on public companies headquartered in one of the 
Nordic countries between 2002 and 2020, retrieving a list of 1565 unique entities. For each 
entity, we retrieve the following variables: 







Bank Total Revenue Quarterly and annually
Total Revenue EUR Quarterly and annually
EBITDA Quarterly and annually
Net Debt Quarterly
Enterprise Value to EBITDA Quarterly
GICS Sub-Industry Code 8-digit GICS Sub-Industry Code
Instrument Type
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All figures in Datastream are reported in EUR as of the final day in the quarter or year. 
We started the data cleaning by using Instrument Type to remove non-companies from the list. 
This includes ETFs, American Depository Receipts and Open-Ended Funds. As we only want 
public companies listed on Nordic stock exchanges, companies on the OTC markets and 
foreign exchanges are also removed. Investigating the dataset, it becomes clear that the 
majority of companies listed on non-major stock exchanges, such as Oslo Axess and Merkur 
Market, frequently have missing values for our desired metrics. To ensure sufficient data 
quality, we remove companies from these exchanges, ending up with companies from Oslo 
Bors ASA, Nasdaq Stockholm, Nasdaq Copenhagen, Nasdaq Helsinki and Nasdaq Iceland. 
While we have not registered any Icelandic buyout deals, we include it in our public sample 
as it is a Nordic country. 
 
6.3 Additional Dataset Processing 
With one dataset for private companies and one for potential public peers, there were some 
additional preparations which were done for both datasets. 
6.3.1 Industry Classification 
As explained in Peer Group Identification, we need each company’s industry classification in 
order to match private companies with public companies. We employ Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS), a four-tiered system developed by Morgan Stanley Capital 
International and Standard & Poor’s, which has been shown to better explain variations in for 
instance valuation multiples, forecasts and growth rates, and financial ratios compared to other 
systems (Koller et al., 2010; MSCI, 2021). The four tiers are, from the broadest to the 
narrowest: Sector, Industry Group, Industry and Sub-Industry. 
 
Most public companies are classified in this system such that each code can be retrieved 
through Datastream, but this is not the case for most private companies. In order to assign 
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relevant GICS codes for our private companies, we compare the name and descriptions of all 
GICS codes to the industry classification assigned by the GP in the quarterly reports18. 
6.3.2 New metrics created 
In order for the datasets to be operational for matching, we used the gathered data to create 
relevant metrics as mentioned in Peer Group Identification. These metrics were made for both 
portfolio companies and public peers. 
 
As a basis for the metrics, LTM revenue and LTM EBITDA for the quarterly sample were 
constructed at a quarterly basis by adding up the four latest quarters of respective trading. 
Subsequently, revenue growth and EBITDA growth were created by calculating the growth in 
LTM for each quarter. For the annual sample, annual revenue and annual EBITDA already 
functioned as LTM figures, so we only had to create their annual growths. As a metric for 
profitability, EBITDA margin was created by dividing LTM EBITDA by LTM revenue. 
Finally, as a proxy for size and thus risk, created Log Sales by taking the logarithm of LTM 
revenue. 
6.3.3 Missing values 
For both the quarterly and the annual sample, there were missing values for some metrics at 
entry and exit, which had to be dealt with in order for the dataset to be operational. 
Frequently, there was no trading data in the quarterly reports for the entry period itself, with 
financial metrics for the company first being available for the following quarter. This problem 
was also present for the annual sample, but was not as prevalent, possibly due to on average 
longer time from entry to the next reporting. While information about the entry period was 
often given ex-post in later reports, this was not always the case. For this reason, LTM revenue 
and EBITDA were first entered for a company in the first period where it was possible to 
construct LTM figures. Similarly, there were occasionally no trading data for the reporting 
period of the exit, if the GP only reported the investment as realized together with the 





EBITDA as proxies for the trading of the exit period. In the few cases where we have data for 
a quarter neither at entry nor exit is missing, we also use the preceding LTM metric instead. 
6.4 Final Datasets 
6.4.1 Private Companies 
While the dataset for our quarterly and annual private companies are one, we split the set up 
in a quarterly and an annual sample to better be able to describe the datasets. This is also in 
line with how the quarterly and the annual samples will be matched independently in the 
matching process. 





In the quarterly sample we see that most of our companies and observations are from Norway 
and Sweden, which is in line with how Norway is Argentum’s home market and Sweden is 
the biggest economy in the Nordics attracting the majority of buyout activity19. We see that 
 
19 https://argentum.no/wp-content/uploads/sites/73/2019/06/Argentum_The-state-of-Nordic-private-equity-2018_digital.pdf  
Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Total Sample
Quarterly Sample
Number of companies 38 40 12 6 96
Number of observations 953 911 229 117 2210
Number of industries 12 11 8 4 17
Average holding period (months) 51 45 42 42 47
Max 59% 21% 19% 43% 59.0 %
Median 5% 2% 1% 9% 3.1 %
Min -10% -67% -66% -5% -67.3 %
Max 45% 129% 27% 62% 128.6 %
Median 6% 0% 0% 13% 3.0 %
Min -24% -205% -75% -22% -205.3 %
Max 47% 32% 33% 23% 46.5 %
Median 17% 13% 20% 17% 14.4 %
Min 4% 0% 6% 6% 0.4 %
Max 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.7 9.0
Median 7.8 7.9 8.2 7.4 7.8
Min 6.9 7.0 7.5 7.3 6.9
  EBITDA Growth at entry
  Log Sales at entry
  EBITDA Margin at entry
  Revenue Growth at entry
Private Companies
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the average holding period for buyout companies are similar across all countries. Both revenue 
growth and EBITDA growth seems volatile, while EBITDA margin at entry has no negative 
values. Through the logarithm of sales at entry, we get an impression of the company sizes, 
which is relatively similar for all countries. 
 
Table 4 – Descriptive Data on Private Companies - Annually 
 
Compared to the quarterly sample, the sample of annual portfolio companies is smaller, both 
in number of companies and observations. However, we see that Finland has a larger number 
of companies in this sample. The revenue growth and EBITDA growth at entry is volatile here 
as well, with a higher median growth. The reason for this probably that the growth metrics in 
the quarterly sample are based on the growth in LTM from one quarter to the next, while it in 
the annual sample are based on growth from one year to the next, implying higher growth. The 
EBITDA margin is somewhat lower, and the size as represented through logarithm of sale is 
similar to the quarterly sample.  
 
Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Total Sample
Annual Sample
Number of companies 10 12 9 14 45
Number of observations 54 79 59 104 296
Number of industries 7 7 4 9 17
Average holding period (months) 41 55 53 63 47
Max 89% 87% 81% 145% 145.1 %
Median 57% 15% 15% 19% 19.2 %
Min 13% -6% -5% -13% -12.5 %
Max 95% 199% 81% 104% 198.7 %
Median 30% 17% 4% 15% 14.3 %
Min -166% -650% -207% -66% -650.0 %
Max 68% 15% 45% 22% 68.0 %
Median 7% 10% 11% 9% 9.7 %
Min 2% 2% -6% 2% -6.3 %
Max 8.3 8.3 8.7 8.5 8.7
Median 7.9 8.0 8.1 7.9 8.0
Min 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.1 7.1
  EBITDA Growth at entry
  EBITDA Margin at entry
  Log Sales at entry
Private Companies
  Revenue Growth at entry
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6.4.2 Public Companies 
Table 5 – Descriptive Data on Public Companies 
 
In the public sample, we see that Sweden as the largest economy has both the largest number 
of companies and by far the largest number of observations. Most industries, based on the 
four-digit GICS code, seems to be present across all countries, except Iceland which is an 
outlier in given the low number of companies and observations. The median LTM revenue is 
somewhat lower in Norway and Sweden compared to the rest of the countries, but the median 
LTM EBITDA seems similar. While the quarterly portfolio companies will potentially be 
matched with any of the observations, the annual portfolio companies will only be matched 












Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Iceland Total
Quarterly Sample
Number of companies 165 311 105 118 18 717
Number of observations 8588 16119.00 5679.00 6431 604 37421
Number of industries 21 22 19 24 10 24
Median LTM Revenue 131425765 157529368 210618608 248556500 200683387 210618608
Median LTM EBITDA 25295503 21041045 28836748 26404500 36457968 28836748
1
Norway is Oslo Børs, Sweden is Nasdaq Stockholm, Denmark is Nasdaq Copenhagen, Finland is Nasdaq Helsinki and Iceland is Nasdaq Iceland
Public Companies
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7. Empirical Analysis 
As shown in the previous section, company value can be expressed as a function of three value 
drivers, profitability, growth and risk, respectively. We predict Enterprise Values by ensuring 
that the comparable companies exhibit similarity in these drivers, in addition to other factors 
that ensure comparability. The factors are emphasized in our models both through matching 
and additionally by the regression model we employ.  
 
7.1 Coarsened Exact Matching 
Coarsened exact matching is used to address the problem in our observational data that 
portfolio companies and public companies generally are not identical before private equity 
entry, and thus not initially suitable for comparable valuation (Iacus et al., 2012). In this 
section we explain how we address this by using the “cem” Stata package to execute coarsened 
exact matching (Blackwell, Iacus, King and Porro, 2010).  
 
7.1.1 Matching Characteristics 
To ensure comparability of public peers and portfolio companies, we control for key 
differences in value drivers. As explained in the thesis introduction, multiple valuation rests 
largely on the expectation that the comparable companies generate similar cash flows in the 
future (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). Put in the statistical context of our application, this means 
that we need to control for variables that are important for PE-selection, which we find to be 
concurrent with factors known to identify comparables in relevant literature. Hahn (2009) 
concluded in his doctoral thesis on PE target selection that profitability, company size and 
performance trends are especially important criteria. The findings are consistent with the 
comparability factors outlined in e.g., Koller et al., (2010) and IPEV Valuation Guidelines 
(2018), which emphasize the same criteria in addition to leverage and minor qualitative 
factors.  
 
Since it was not possible to supply the PE dataset with public sources (see Data) we rely 
exclusively on information from quarterly reports. This has consequences for the number of 
matching variables we can use and leaves us unable to fully satisfy the ignorability assumption 
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of independence between treatment effect and matching covariate, because GPs generally do 
not provide pre-entry financials. This is especially challenging for leverage which is an 
important factor for value that should preferably be included as a covariate. Matching on 
capital structure data from the quarterly reports would however be a major violation of the 
pre-treatment assumption due to the immediate and substantial changes in debt brought on by 
a leveraged buyout. This is fortunately not the case for the remaining matching metrics that 
we use.  
 
Financial performance is a key factor for assigning matches, preferably measured by 
trend/growth metrics such as revenue growth, EBITDA growth, while profitability can be 
measured by EBITDA-margin (Koller et al., 2010; Hahn, 2009). The only absolute measure 
we match on is the logarithm of revenue, Log revenue, which in accordance with Hahn (2009) 
is a fitting measure for company size that enables simple/standardized comparisons that are 
difficult to draw from raw revenue numbers. This is important since we are unable to capture 
the pre-entry capital structures/enterprise values which would arguably have been the best size 
measures. As mentioned in the Peer Group Identification section, risk is a key value driver 
that we seek to capture in matching, which is proxied by precisely company size, since 
portfolio company cost of capital is not available. 
 
Revenue and EBITDA growth are measured on a LTM basis, with a downside being that we 
violate the pre-treatment ignorability assumption to some extent as a consequence, since 
growth measures require time-series data. However, we argue that PE ownership has not had 
a considerable effect on these metrics since they are gathered at max one year after entry. 
These metrics aims to capture the importance of growth in matching, while the EBITDA-
margin reflects company profitability. Together with time and industry covariates, these 
variables are used as input to CEM. 
 
We process the PE data before employing CEM into a matching database with only entry 
observations for the portfolio companies. The database is supplied with the entire public set 
with no restrictions on timing, since the portfolio companies have varying entries and must be 
able to search for Nordic public peers in their unique entry period. The table below shows the 
distribution of treated and untreated observations in the database, with the 141 treated 
representing the entry data for the PE companies, and the 37,558 untreated representing the 
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Nordic public companies with quarterly entries from 2002-2021. The matching universe for 
the annual PE companies is a quarter of the total public sample, 9,388 observations.  
 




We utilize the advantageous design of CEM and coarsen into bins set at our discretion, 
maintaining control of the trade-off between the number of matched portfolio companies and 
model dependency (King, 2018). We test these results against the predictions we get when 
using CEMs default binning algorithm to compare results.  
 
In line with the sequence of comparable selection described in Koller et al., (2010), we start 
with industry as a prerequisite in matching. We run both four and six-digit GICS codes in 
CEM which corresponds to respectively 25 different industry groups and 71 industries20. To 
implement GICS exact matching, we use the cutpoints syntax in cem and indicate that we 
require a perfect match. The same logic applies for time, since we require an exact match for 
the corresponding entry dates (which is “quarter-year” for quarterlies and “year-end” for 
annuals). Since we require a perfect match on industry group/industry and time for all 
iterations, remaining variables are necessarily coarsened quite broadly to avoid excessive 
pruning. Financial performance measures Revenue growth, EBITDA growth, EBITDA margin 
and size measure Log revenue are thus coarsened into relatively broad bins:       
 






• Revenue growth is coarsened into principally negative and positive bins, however with 
cutpoints above negative and positive 200% to ensure that extreme values are pruned. 
The reason why we use such loose thresholds for cut-off is to allow companies with 
for instance one-off fluctuations in trading to still be matched. 
• EBITDA growth is coarsened similar as revenue growth, with corresponding cutpoints. 
• EBITDA margin is coarsened into negative and positive bins. 
• Log revenue has its purpose in ensuring that very large(small) public companies are 
not matched with our medium sized sample of PE portfolio companies. Thus, we 
 42
coarsen it into bins that achieves this purpose, which we found with cut-offs at log 
revenue of below six and above nine, respectively. 
 
If we apply more fine-grained coarsening, there simply are not enough matches due to the 
curse of dimensionality. As a consequence, the performance of our predictions relies largely 
on industry and the broad financial trends of the companies. See appendix for table of 
observation frequency for industries. Additionally, we run all iterations using CEMs default 
coarsening on the variables, with the exception of Industry and Entry time, because the default 
coarsening is unable to coarsen them. The general methodology is to run several iterations for 
all the model specifications and register and compare results.  These are ultimately compared 
in the results section, where we also describe each limitation/rule that we apply beyond 
coarsening. After coarsening we get matched strata, which are then passed on to prediction in 
their respective uncoarsened format (Iacus et al., 2012). The table below illustrates what a 
matched pair may look like. The “Positive”, “Negative” and “Medium” values are for 
illustration purposes only, the matches are assigned with their corresponding numeric values 
which are used post-matching. 
Table 11 – Matching Illustration 
 
7.2 Prediction Models 
After we identify the matched peers in the respective strata from CEM, we process the data 
and move on to enterprise multiple predictions. The post-matching processing essentially 
ensures that pruned observations are removed from the set and that portfolio companies 
assigned to the same stratum are separated to ensure that they do not affect each other. The 
prediction models we employ are 1) Matched peers median multiples, and 2) Multiple 
regression. The performance is measured by mean squared error, using the transaction price 
as the true observation. 
7.2.1 Median Prediction 
The peer median model is relatively intuitive as it is explicitly contingent on the quality of the 
matching, extracting the median of the matched peers’ enterprise multiple in each relevant 
Company Entry Quarter GICS Industry Name Revenue Growth EBITDA-Margin EBITDA Growth Log Revenue
Private Equity 31/12/2010 101010 Energy Equipment Services Positive Positive Negative Medium
Public #1 31/12/2010 101010 Energy Equipment Services Positive Positive Negative Medium
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time period. If we obtain accurate aggregated results by using the peer median, it is likely 
because the matching process using CEM is successful in identifying comparable firms that 
are able to indicate an accurate multiple at exit, when assigned at entry. We expect that the 
closest quarters up to and including twelve months prior to exit is most fitting (and most 
unbiased) to evaluate predictions against exit transaction prices, because as we observed in 
some quarterly reports, GPs will likely have had offers to base valuations of if it gets closer to 
realization.  
7.2.2 Regression Model 
The multiple regression model is pragmatically used as a test to see if a regression of the 
matched public company’s enterprise multiple and trading can be used to predict portfolio 
companies’ values near exit and at exit. We regress the chosen peers’ enterprise multiple for 
each portfolio company using OLS in the respective holding period, with predictors created 
from peer data. It is not a strong model from an econometric perspective, primarily since the 
four21 assumptions for unbiasedness are not satisfied. The assumption that the error term u has 
a conditional mean of zero (ZCM) given any values of the independent variables is certainly 
violated due to omitted variable bias, as there are many unobserved variables that are 
correlated with both the predictors and the enterprise multiple (Woolridge, 2013). We can thus 
conclude that there is an endogeneity problem since the ZCM assumption is violated. 
Nonetheless we run the regression as a point of reference, with concept and specification as 
follows. 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵2𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 + 𝐵3𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑢 
Where, 
𝑢 = 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚, 𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 
𝐵0 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 
𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
 
21 Linearity in parameters, random sampling, sample variation in predictors and zero conditional mean. See e.g., Woolridge 
(2013). 
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We run the model separately for each portfolio company and divide the results into their 
respective frequency of reporting, quarterly and annually. For the quarterlies, we run 
regressions and obtain predictions in the three nearest quarters to exit and at exit. For the 
annual sample we regress the two years prior to exit as well as at exit. To ensure that each 
portfolio company is predicted only by the financials from its relevant matched peers, we run 
one regression for each portfolio company (totaling 141 regressions) in all relevant time 
frames using the Stata command statsby, which allows us to streamline the process. The 
variables we use are EBITDA, Revenue, Quarter_Year (time dummy), and Industry (which is 
accounted for through CEM). We multiply the portfolio companies’ trading by the regression 
coefficients and add the relevant dummy coefficient from each regression to obtain the 
predicted multiple for any given quarter/year.  
 
7.2.3 Outliers and Rules 
Relative valuation for any asset class will usually include a method to prevent outliers from 
skewing results, sometimes handled at database level by the reporting services that provide 
the financials. Such services may exclude outliers when computing averages or constrain the 
accepted intervals for multiples in general (Damodaran, 2011). One of the most regular method 
of dealing with outliers first-hand is using medians, which are more meaningful than averages 
that are subject to the distortions of extreme values. We want to identify the most appropriate 
way of addressing outliers in our public dataset, so that we are able to implement a “set of 
rules” to the tool. After testing which coarsening level and GICS specification predicts the 
most accurate results, we address outliers by implementing exclusion rules based on results, 
which we account for thoroughly in the results section.  
 
We test the model specifications in an iterative process with much of the same logic as with 
coarsening: first we evaluate prediction results without exclusions or constraints, and then 
step-by-step implement rules that is thought to increase prediction accuracy, although typically 
at the expense of exclusion. This constraining process is implemented equally for both models 
and subsamples, which we generally expect to be more significant for the regression since it 




7.2.4 Mean Squared Error 
In order to draw inferences from the prediction results we need a measure that quantifies how 
well the predictions match the true values we observe. We evaluate prediction results in line 
with James et al., (2013) using the mean square error. As seen in the formula below, the MSE 
is calculated by squaring the difference between true and predicted response. Since MSE is 
squared, it is by nature highly sensitive to extreme values/outliers, which dominate the 
calculation if present. Thus, we expect MSE for the regression to be far off initially and 
substantially improved when we address extreme values.  If CEM does a good job of matching, 
we expect that the median model will produce consistently low MSEs leading up to exit. We 
calculate and evaluate the MSE for all three predictions in the periods nearing exit, i.e., for the 
four closest quarters for the quarterly subsample, and for the two nearest years for the annual 











𝑛 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 









8. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we will first compare the predicted exit multiple for each portfolio company 
given by our two models with the actual exit multiple. This provides us with a mean squared 
error for each prediction, which is then aggregated by calculating the average MSE for all 
predictions. The MSE is hard to interpret in isolation, for our purpose it must be evaluated 
relative to other model specifications. After evaluating which of our prediction models 
perform the best relatively, we move on with the best specifications and compare their 
predictions to the GP estimates in the quarters and years leading up to exit. We thus evaluate 
how applicable the models would be as a tool in practice. 
 
As the results originate from an iterative process where model specifications are tested, 
adjusted for what is observed, and then re-tested, we will present the results and outline our 
process simultaneously, providing insight and discussion of the choices made. This will 
provide context to our discussion of the best performing specifications compared to GP 
estimates in the time leading up to exit. Finally, we discuss all the results seen together and 
consider limitations. 
 
8.1 Exit Prediction and Internal Model Evaluation 
Exit is the first point in time where the actual transaction value is observable, referred to as 
the true response (James et al., 2013). In the following table, the predicted exit responses for 
portfolio companies are subtracted from the true response and squared, each number thus 
represents an MSE corresponding to a specified variant of GICS coarsening and set of 
exclusion rules (that are increasingly strict). This is with the exception of the cursive numbers 
which indicate the number of portfolio companies that are predicted, with initial sample size 
n of 96 for the quarterly sample and 41 for the annual sample. The difference in the number 
of predicted portfolio companies and the respective sample size thus represents the amount of 
portfolio companies that were pruned.  
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Table 12 – Mean Squared Error Predictions at Exit 
 
We start by evaluating whether to use a narrow or wider variant of the GICS classification. It 
is concluded that the wider GICS seems better suited for our purpose, as the narrower GICS 
excludes too many portfolio companies with no gain in predictive performance of neither the 
median nor the regression model. This is true for both custom and default bins. We thus move 
forward with the wider specification and implement exclusion measures based on common 
features of the specification results. 
 
First, we observed that extreme values in the enterprise multiples from peers substantially 
distorted the predictions. For example, EBITDA is an item calculated after nonoperating 
expenses, and thus may be subjected to substantial one-offs that distort the public companies’ 
enterprise multiples, which we are unable to normalize. Both our prediction models were 
Custom Bins Default Bins Custom Bins Default Bins
Narrow GICS
Median Peer Multiple Model 704                   127                   170                   208                   
Regression Model 7 605 026       87 168              594 904          2 576                
# Portfolio Companies 59                      75                      21                      31                      
Wider GICS
Median Peer Multiple Model 48                     44                     82                     138                   
Regression Model 864 495            3 140                442 575            43 804              
# Portfolio Companies 86                      88                      32                      37                      
Excluding Extreme Peer Values
1
Median Peer Multiple Model 28                     37                     26                     115                   
Regression Model 1 256                1 340                11 994              386                   
# Portfolio Companies 86                      88                      32                      37                      
Excluding Portcos With ≤ 2 peers
Median Peer Multiple Model 28                     38                     20                     129                   
Regression Model 1 331                159                   451                   342                   
# Portfolio Companies 71                      66                      25                      34                      
Excluding Portcos With ≤ 4 peers
Median Peer Multiple Model 23                     45                     27                     35                     
Regression Model 335                   123                   29                     55                     
# Portfolio Companies 50                      44                      19                      20                      
Excluding Banking and Insurance
Median Peer Multiple Model 24                     45                     27                     35                     
Regression Model 62                     123                   29                     55                     
# Portfolio Companies 48                      44                      19                      20                      
1
Excluding Enterprise Multiples > 50 and < 0
Quarterly (n=96) Annual (n=41)
Mean Squared Error of Predictions
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distorted by extreme values, but especially the regression model since its predictions is not 
inherently protected from outliers, compared to the median. This is the most prevalent for large 
values of EV/EBITDA, as Datastream already removes negative EV/EBITDA values if caused 
by negative EBITDA (see Data). Since we cannot deal with these cases explicitly, we find the 
best alternative is to remove them. Thus, all positive enterprise multiples above 50x are 
removed, together with the remaining negative enterprise multiples originating from negative 
EVs. After removing these values from the public dataset, the regression MSE for the quarterly 
custom bin specification went from 864,495 to 1,256, which is a considerable improvement in 
relative terms, but still notably worse than the median peer multiple. We observe similar 
effects for all other specifications as well. 
 
Second, we noted that the exit predictions of portfolio companies with few peers performed 
far worse than the average, which was especially true for the regressions where portfolio 
companies became too reliant on the company-specific development of a few companies. 
Thus, we implemented rules indicating that portfolio companies with equal to or less than two 
peers should be excluded, afterwards increasing this threshold to four peers. These rules 
improved regression MSE for all regression specifications, especially when demanding more 
than four peers. 
 
Finally, due to the unique characteristics of capital structure in the banking and insurance 
industry, we observed that the few portfolio companies in this industry were consistently 
predicted poorly on the basis of the industry groups’ unique enterprise multiples. This was 
however only applicable for the quarterly custom bins specification, as neither the other 
specifications nor the annual sample contained any portfolio companies in this industry.  
 
Ultimately, after having implemented a four-digit industry code as well as three rules of 
exclusion, we had addressed all apparent unreasonable distortions. The improvement was 
substantial for the regression model, since the rules were able to address the outliers that 
severely influenced its initial predictions. The median model was not enhanced much beyond 
the improvement from exclusion of extreme values of peer enterprise multiples and remained 
consistent afterwards. It is thus evident that the median model is applicable without having to 
implement many explicit measures. 
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The results seem to suggest that defining custom bins based on variable knowledge compared 
to using default bins is beneficial to identifying well suited matches22, after having accounted 
for distortions from outliers. The default algorithm often seems to perform better in the first 
iterations, but after excluding what we view as distortions in the data, it seems like the custom 
bins are more able to capture the underlying relationship between the matching variables and 
EV/EBITDA. This is in line with our findings from the literature that similarity in growth, 
profitability and risk are tied to predicting similar EV/EBITDA multiples, which we capture 
by basing our custom bins on broad trends in these factors.  
 
The custom bins chosen for the matching variables are broad, and one could argue that more 
relevant matches, and thus better predictions, could have been assigned if the bins were finer 
and a larger public sample such as all listed European companies was used. An issue of setting 
finer cut-off points is that one might cut matches that are close to perfect, e.g., when trying to 
categorize between “medium” and “high” revenue growth. If the cut-off is at 50%, then a 
portfolio company with 51% revenue growth will never be in the same stratum, and thus never 
match with a public peer which is identical in all variables except having a 49% revenue 
growth (see curse of dimensionality under Matching). 
  
 
22 This is in line with the preferred use of CEM, to coarsen covariates into substantive groups that preserve information. See 
Blackwell et al., (2010). 
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8.2 Comparing Predictions to GP Estimates 
Having compared and identified the most accurate model specifications, we compare the 
model predictions to the respective GP estimates in the periods leading up to exit 
Quarterly Sample 
Table 13 – Mean Squared Error Predictions Prior to Exit - Quarterly 
 
For the quarterly sample with matches from custom bins, we observe that the MSE of the 
median model is quite consistent in all quarters in the twelve months before exit, but not as 
accurate as the GPs’ estimation when the exit is six months or less away. The large spike in 
GP accuracy between twelve and six months is likely because the GP often receives an 
indicative offer or has entered negotiations. The median model exhibits consistency in its 
predictions, and also seems to predict at least at the level of GP accuracy when moving nine 
months or further away from exit.  
 
The GP estimates for the portfolio companies that are present when applying default bins 
exhibits similar dynamic to the GP estimates for custom bins between nine and six months 
prior to exit, where accuracy is notably increased. The default specification for the median 
peer multiple is performing worse, especially from six months and earlier. Investigating this 
data, the relatively high MSE of 123,25 is due to a large prediction miss from a singular 
portfolio company. The company in question was not assigned any matches by CEM when 
applying custom bins, suggesting that leveraging knowledge of the variables we coarsen helps 
avoid poor matches, however this is difficult to say for certain. This statement is also supported 
3 Months Prior 6 Months Prior 9 Months Prior 12 Months Prior
Custom Bins
Median Peer Multiple 17,70 20,02 21,22 23,93
Regression 67,48 56,79 51,70 50,55
General Partner Estimate 5,06 9,18 29,41 46,23
Default Bins
Median Peer Multiple 69,11 65,01 123,25 39,81
Regression 117,02 110,47 97,30 101,62
General Partner Estimate 11,05 8,45 68,68 68,06
Mean Squared Error Predictions - Quarterly 
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by the outperformance of the custom bins versus the default bins for the median model in all 
periods for the quarterly subsample. The regression model is relatively inaccurate but is 
however somewhat consistent.  
8.2.1 Annual Sample 
Table 14 – Mean Squared Error Predictions Prior to Exit - Annually 
 
For the annual sample, the GP prediction becomes more accurate closer to exit, supporting our 
findings for the quarterly sample which indicated that accuracy close to exit stems from unique 
deal information. It should be noted that the smaller annual sample size of 41 companies 
compared to 96 in the quarterly sample makes it relatively more prone to random noise and is 
thus more difficult to draw inferences from, especially when pruned down to about half of its 
initial sample size. 
 
In summary, a median model with relatively few exclusion rules seems to perform quite 
consistent, although not more accurate than the GPs when approaching realization. This is in 
line with our expectations given the GPs information advantage close to exit. However, 
moving further than six months away from exit, our results suggests that our best performing 
specification using substantive knowledge on variable coarsening may provide a consistent 
and valid second opinion on the Enterprise Value of portfolio companies.  
8.2.2 Limitations 
While it seems like our median model is able to predict exit values with similar accuracy as 
the GP further than six months away from exit, the predictions at company level are still 
frequently inaccurate, and the model aggregated MSE is highly sensitive to singular but large 
prediction misses. One explanation could be that the matching algorithm assigns peers that are 
1 Year Prior 2 Year Prior
Custom Bins
Median Peer Multiple 25,91 27,89
Regression 32,50 36,82
General Partner Estimate 4,02 12,59
Default Bins
Median Peer Multiple 25,50 32,05
Regression 47,63 45,31
General Partner Estimate 11,98 40,08
Mean Squared Error Predictions - Annually
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similar to the portfolio company at PE entry, but the companies might not necessarily be 
comparable at realization after typically 3-8 years (Kaplan and Sensoy, 2014). Portfolio 
companies are often acquired by a private equity firm with the intent of implementing 
measures such that the business can be changed to attract higher valuations, or the company 
can be used as a platform for acquisitions facilitating inorganic company growth, both 
entailing substantial change. Ideally, the matches would thus be updated more frequently, 
however this does not seem feasible in our current framework since our methods assumes that 
buyout treatment is the only difference between the public and private companies. This 
assumption would be severely violated with frequent matching updates, since buyout would 
have already occurred. At the extreme end, there is thus reason to believe that our models are 
not able to properly value abnormal over- or underperformers deviating from peer median 
multiples. This is unfortunate as many PE funds will have a few portfolio companies that are 
transformed into markets leaders.  
 
Sample size 
A key limitation for the inference from our findings is the relatively small and non-random PE 
sample sizes. The results of our study are for instance strictly speaking only applicable to 
Nordic portfolio companies in mid-market funds that are managed by top quartile private 
equity firms. The limited sample size might also influence how the rules for exclusion are 
implemented. In our results, we saw an example of how portfolio companies within the 
banking sector only showed up in the wider GICS custom bin specification, where it became 
apparent that EV/EBITDA is not a good valuation tool for this industry. With an even smaller 
sample size, this rule might not have been implemented, underscoring that the model can only 
be relied on to work for similar companies it has predicted in the past. 
 
Covariates 
Another issue during matching is that the portfolio companies are paired with public peers 
based on metrics from a single quarter or year, which may not be representative for its longer-
term trend. While basing financial metrics on LTM figures mitigates this issue somewhat, the 
metrics might still be volatile. As we have already mentioned, there are confounders that are 
relevant for PE selection and enterprise multiple prediction that we were unable to match on. 
It is plausible that these would have increased the quality of matches, especially if we had used 
a larger public sample so that the “increased” curse of dimensionality introduced by new 
covariates would be somewhat offset by an increase in sample size. This further suggests that 
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that Argentum should request more accounting information in the quarterly reports they 
receive in order to get information about confounders, especially Net Debt at entry, which 
might provide better matches and thus better predictions. The results might also give LPs 
incentives to push the GP harder for precise exit dates, as this will give them a better view of 
what time to trust GP valuations over the peer model. Such information might be beneficial 
for Argentum’s secondary team in knowing which prediction of the exit value is the most 
probable when valuating fund stakes in interim periods. 
 
Mean Squared Error 
While MSE is the desired measure for evaluating predictions, an issue with solely regarding 
MSE at the aggregated level is that large deviations are weighed heavily. Thus, we are 
implicitly unable to remedy situations where we are correct in most predictions but miss 
substantially on a singular one. This could e.g., be addressed by implementing measures that 
made sure that certain values are investigated and addressed subjectively. As we identified 
when investigated our results, one large prediction miss was able to heavily influence one of 
the datapoints in our results. 
 
Marketability Discount 
In line with our expectation and literature on marketability, we consistently overestimate 
valuations relative to the GPs when applying peer multiples without discounts to private 
companies in periods before exit (Harjoto and Paglia, 2010). Predictions would thus be more 
accurate with a discount up to a certain percentage, but it seems somewhat arbitrary to apply 
it without investigating the derivation of each portfolio companies predicted multiple 
thoroughly, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
8.2.3 Conclusion 
In this thesis we set out to investigate if a multiple based statistical approach would be able to 
deliver unbiased and accurate valuations. Compared to the GP, our models are generally less 
accurate, with the expectation of the median model that performs at least at the level of the GP 
when further than six months prior to exit. This model is however frequently inaccurate at 
company level. Few, but large prediction errors are penalized heavily across all predictions 
due to the nature of MSE, which squares the difference between predicted and true responses. 
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This is particularly evident when we address outliers for the regression model, where MSE 
moves drastically down as a few large misses are pruned. We also note that the GP valuations 
are consistent across all our samples, exhibiting no signs of bias other than at the two quarters 
closest to exit, where we suspect that they learn transaction details from potential buyers. 
The limitations to our results make the peer model somewhat difficult to implement 
successfully at the present for an LP like Argentum, as there are many boundaries to the 
applicableness of the tool that. Even so, the sample that the tool is successfully tested on, 
Nordic buyout companies, is one of the core focuses of Argentum. Thus, as long as the 
predicted company does not change too much from its original peers and is not heading for 
bankruptcy, the model might already be usable for a relatively large part of Argentum’s 
portfolio.  
 
Otherwise, the peer model can be regarded as in experimental stages, where Argentum can 
apply their expert knowledge about the PE industry to tweak the bins to better catch nuances 
in the buyout segment, implement other rules, or differentiate in how predictions from 
different GPs are regarded given their repeat business with them. A substantial advantage with 
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Frequency of GICS Industries
GICS Industry Group Name Public Companies Private Companies
Automobiles & Components 402 .
Banks 3266 .
Capital Goods 6265 26
Commercial  & Professional Services 1937 15
Consumer Durables & Apparel 1322 13
Consumer Services 603 14
Diversified Financials 1819 3
Energy 1655 5
Food & Staples Retailing 249 2
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 1408 3
Health Care Equipment & Services 1862 13
Household & Personal Products 160 2
Insurance 559 1
Materials 2122 10
Media & Entertainment 1061 2
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sc. 2304 1
Real Estate 2461 .
Retailing 1097 6
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equip. 210 .
Software & Services 2237 18
Technology Hardware & Equipment 2368 4
Telecommunication Services 353 2
Transportation 1591 1
Utilities 247 .
